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Abstract 
Previous research (Sharman & Calacouris, 2010) found that participants’ achievement-
motivation was associated with the inflation of memory and confidence for unlikely 
achievement-related events in childhood. Similarly, other research has shown correlations 
between achievement motivation and grade inflation. In the current studies, we experimentally 
investigate the effect of false feedback and achievement-motivation on memory distortion for an 
unlikely childhood event (e.g., inventing an important device). In Experiment 1, we found that 
false feedback did have an effect, but contrary to previous research, self-reported achievement-
motivation was not a statistically significant correlate of memory distortion. In Experiment 2, we 
again found a main effect for false feedback, no main effect of motivation, and an interaction. 
Both Experiments did not find, as earlier research had, a significant relationship between 
achievement-motivation and achievement-related memory distortion. We suggest others use 
different methods to ours when attempting to demonstrate a causal relationships between 
motivation and false memories. 
Keywords: memory distortion, motivation, false feedback, suggestion, misinformation, 
post event information, achievement 
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Lessons for Future Research: Two Experiments Failed to Reproduce a Relationship Between 
Achievement Motivation and Autobiographical Memory Distortion 
It is well established that false feedback, also known as suggestion, misinformation, or 
post-event information, can create memory distortions. But it is not yet firmly established 
whether motivations can also cause memory distortions. The effect of motivation on memory 
errors is an important question with clear applications for the real world. For example, it is 
possible that various motivations produce memory distortions in psychotherapy or in eyewitness 
testimony in court. Or perhaps in the case of Brian Williams’ reported memory errors of a 
helicopter ride in Iraq in 2003 (West, 2015), we might wonder if some motivation, perhaps 
ambition or some other social motivation, might have exacerbated these errors. William’s 
apparent embellishments include description of being under fire in a helicopter, a potential false 
memory that may be related to a self-enhancing motivation, though there are other possible 
explanations (e.g., a conscious misrepresentation).  Similarly, Hillary Clinton appeared to 
misremember landing under sniper fire in Bosnia, again a self-enhancing error that we cannot be 
sure was a conscious or unconscious error (Healy & Seelye, 2008). Although there is research 
illuminating the relationship between motivation and memory (McClelland, Scioli, & Weaver, 
1998; Woike, Mcleod, & Goggin, 2003; Woike, 2008; Woike, Bender, & Besner, 2009; 
Murayama, & Elliot, 2011) it is surprising that there is little research focusing on the effect of 
motivation on memory distortion. A combination of theory and past research might suggest that 
underlying motivations would affect memory distortions. In this current study, we build on work 
by Sharman and Calacouris (2010) and experimentally investigate how the motivation to achieve 
affects memory distortions in a false feedback (suggestion) paradigm. 
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Research on the effect of motivation on cognition in general might hold promise for 
finding a link between motivation and memory distortions. Motivation guides what we pay 
attention to (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997), and attention is important for episodic memory 
for a given stimulus. In addition, Kunda (1990) outlines research showing that people are 
motivated to evaluate evidence in such a way as to reach a conclusion that most closely matches 
their motivations. Similarly, Ditto and Lopez (1992) found that motivations seemed to directly 
affect the amount of active cognition (scrutiny) participants used when examining information 
they either liked or disliked. Information that conflicted with participants’ motives was met with 
effortful attempts to find fault in the information, compared to information they preferred. Ditto, 
Pizarro, and Tannenbaum (2009) argued that motivation also affects moral reasoning, further 
demonstrating motivation’s role in cognition. Likewise, motivation has been linked to other 
biases, such as hindsight bias (e.g., Hell, Gigerenzer, Gauggel, Mall, & Müller, 1988; Pezzo & 
Pezzo, 2007). Such research into motivation and general cognition makes it reasonable to 
hypothesize that motivation might also affect other specific aspects of cognition, such as memory 
distortions. 
Though the relationship between motivation and false memories has not yet been fully 
researched, there are numerous past articles on the relationship between motivation and memory. 
In this research, implicit motives (sometimes measured via Picture Story Exercises, Ramsay & 
Pang, 2013; Schultheiss, Liening, & Schad, 2008; including the Thematic Apperception Test, 
Gruber & Kreuzpointner, 2013) and explicit motives (measured by asking participants directly 
how much they feel a need for achievement, affiliation, etc.), are measured in conjunction with 
measures of memory. For example, in McClelland et al. (1998) found that in older adults implicit 
motives for affiliation, power, and achievement were associated with better recall of written 
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material. Woike et al. (2003) indicated differing effects on memory depending on whether the 
motivation was implicit or explicit. Interestingly, they found that explicit achievement (but not 
affiliation) motives were associated with higher recall of memories that relate to the self-
concept—and therefore linked to autobiographical memory. Autobiographical memory has been 
framed as being a type of recall that is particularly linked to the self-concept (e.g., see Conway, 
2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), Woike (2008) similarly found that explicit motives 
modulate recall of events linked to the self-concept, as well as routine experiences that represent 
typical self-attributed behaviors that facilitate the person’s own current goals. 
There is some research that indirectly suggests that motivation can distort memory. For 
example, Bahrick, Hall, and Berger (1996) found that college students, when asked to recall their 
high school grades, tended to inflate them upwards. This could be due to a motivation on the part 
of the students. Importantly, the students knew that the researchers would have access to their 
actual grades, making it probable that some students inflated their grades fully believing they 
were being accurate. Lower grades were much more likely to be inflated upwards, while higher 
grades were likely to be reported more accurately—suggesting a self-serving bias or a motivation 
was likely a factor. In other research, Kennedy, Mather, and Carstensen (2004) found that older 
people had a self-serving positive bias in their recall of autobiographical memories. The 
implication being that the motivation to remember a positive life led to memory distortions. 
However, these studies were correlational—they did not manipulate motivation in an experiment 
to show that motivation causes memory distortions. 
There has also been some direct research looking at motivation and memory distortion. 
Sharman & Calacouris (2010) used the imagination inflation paradigm (Garry, Manning, Loftus, 
& Sherman, 1996) which involves participants going through a guided imagery exercise that 
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subsequently inflates memory of an unlikely event. They found that the self-reported explicit 
achievement motivation of participants was associated with larger memory distortions for 
achievement-related childhood events (e.g., inventing an important device). Following an 
imagination inflation technique with some false suggestions that certain events occurred in 
childhood, participants who scored higher on measures of achievement motivation tended to 
overinflate memory of, and confidence in, their achievement of an unlikely achievement related 
event in childhood. They also examined affiliation motivation, but found a negligible correlation 
with affiliation-related autobiographical memory (cf. Woike et al., 2003). Although Sharman and 
Calacouris’ (2010) results were correlational, it is nonetheless one of the few articles to establish 
a relationship between motivation and false memories of autobiographical events.  
Motivation, according to the cognitive appraisal theory of emotion, can be defined as the 
disposition to reach a goal (see Lazarus, 1991). Achievement-motivation is a specific type of 
motivation that measures the tendency to want to reach standards of excellence and do things 
progressively better (McClelland, 1985). Murray (1938) considered the need to achieve as a 
“consistent trait of personality” (p. 61). McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, and Lowell (1953) 
expanded upon Murray’s conceptualization of need for achievement to develop achievement 
motive research. Subsequently, Jackson (1967) used Murray’s conceptualization to create the 
need for achievement subscale on the Personality Research Form (PRF; see also Jackson, 1987). 
Singer (1990) described the need for achievement as life goal to “create a lasting and notable 
accomplishment,” and measured this by participants self-reporting the extent to which they 
desired that goal. Having reviewed past literature on motivation and false memory, identified a 
gap in the literature, and defined explicit achievement motivation more specifically, we next 
describe the current studies. 
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The Present Experiments 
 Here, we built on Sharman and Calacouris’ (2010) study, using some of the same 
questionnaires they did, we used a similar false-feedback (suggestion) memory distortion 
paradigm to the one they used, although we did not utilize the imagination inflation exercise that 
they used. We chose to remove the imagination inflation aspect so that we could extend previous 
research by more clearly distinguishing what was causing changes in false memory rates. The 
false-feedback technique we employ involves telling participants that an unlikely event probably 
happened to them in the past (see Bernstein, Laney, Morris, & Loftus, 2005). We investigated 
whether self-reported achievement motivation (explicit) had a similarly positive association with 
memory inflation for achievement-related events in childhood. Memory inflation means the 
pretest to posttest increase in self-reported memory of the event. In Experiment 1, we 
investigated the effects of both false feedback and achievement-motivation on memory 
distortion. In Experiment 2, we used an experimental design to compare the respective causal 
effects of motivation and false feedback on memory distortion. We analyzed the main effects and 
interactions of the independent variables false feedback and motivation, on the dependent 
variable memory distortion. Based on past research on the misinformation effect and false-
feedback studies (see Loftus, 2005, for a review), we hypothesized that: 
  Hypothesis 1. False feedback will have a significant effect on memory distortion.  
 Hypothesis 2. In congruence with Sharman and Calacouris’ (2010) findings, we also 
hypothesized that base rate achievement-motivation would correlate with memory distortions. 
 Hypothesis 3. Based on past correlational studies, we further hypothesized that 
manipulating motivation would demonstrate a causal relationship with memory distortions.  
Experiment 1 
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 In this study we examined the relationship between self-reported achievement-motivation 
and memory distortion of unlikely events in childhood. We gave participants false-feedback that 
an unlikely event did likely happen. The choice of which event a subject received false 
information about was based on what the participant had initially reported little memory of and 
low confidence in. We did this over two sessions, one week apart. 
Method 
Participants. Two hundred and twenty undergraduates participated online for course 
credit at a large research university in the Southwestern United States. Of these, 15 participants 
were subsequently excluded from analysis because they failed to correctly answer questions 
checking that they were paying attention and reading the questions, leaving 205 participants in 
our analysis. Of these 205, 17.1% were freshmen, 19.5% sophomores, 36.6% juniors, and 26.8% 
seniors; participants were over 18, but age was not recorded in the dataset due to a technical 
error. Of the 205 adults, 171 were female (83.4%), 33 (16.1%) were male, and 1 (.005%) did not 
indicate their gender. Ethnicity was distributed as follows: 109 (53.2%) Asian, 34 (16.6%) 
Latino or Hispanic, 34 (16.6%) White, 1 (.5%) African American, and 27 (13.2%) indicated two 
or more ethnicities. These studies were approved by the Institutional Review Board (UCI IRB 
HS# 20141084).  
Design. Subjects participated in two sessions, one week apart. Participants were informed 
they were free to withdraw from the study at any time. Pretest measures for motivation, as well 
as memory of and confidence for various childhood events were taken in Session 1. In Session 2 
participants were randomly assigned into motivation manipulations and later given false-
feedback about a childhood event for which they had indicated low memory of and confidence of 
in Session 1. After posttest measures of self-reported achievement-motivation were completed, 
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the participants indicated posttest ratings of how clear their memory was of childhood events, 
and how confident they were that those events happened. Considerations of power determined 
that to distinguish an effect size of r = .2, a target sample size of at least 97 in each condition 
would be advisable (see Cohen, 1988; table on p. 102, with power = .8). Our actual sample 
analyzed was 205, close to the planned 194. 
Materials and procedure.  
Session 1.  
Life Events Inventory. In Session 1, participants first answered demographic questions, 
then completed a Life Event Inventory (Garry et al., 1996) containing 11 achievement-related 
items (e.g. “you invented an important device” and “You won a ‘most valuable player’ (or 
similar) sports award”) and 11 items not related to achievement. Following each item, 
participants were asked to rate their confidence (“Please rate how confident you are that the 
event happened to you before the age of 10” on an 8-point scale with anchors “definitely did not 
happen” and “definitely did happen”) and their memory (“Please also rate your memory for the 
event” with anchors “No memory of event at all” and “Clear & complete memory of event”). 
Achievement-motivation. The participants then answered (pre-test) questions assessing 
their achievement-motivation, such as a single item Life Goals Sentence (Singer, 1990); “I 
would like to create a lasting and notable accomplishment”, using a 21 point Likert scale with 
three anchors –10 = Extremely undesirable, 0 = Neutral, and 10 = Extremely desirable). Then 
they completed 16 items of the Personality Research Form-E (PRF-E, Jackson, 1987), 
responding with ‘‘true’’ or ‘‘false’’ to statements describing an achievement motive (e.g., “I will 
not be satisfied until I am the best in my field of work” and “My goal is to do at least a little bit 
more than anyone else has done before”). Both these measures assessed achievement-motivation. 
ACHIEVEMENT MOTIVATION & AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY 10 
Personality measures. Partly to match the cover story that this study was about 
personality, questionnaires measuring tendencies to fantasize, absorb, and dissociate were 
completed. Fantasy proneness, which is the tendency to fantasize, was measured by the Creative 
Experience Questionnaire (Merckelbach, Horselenberg, & Muris, 2001). The Tellegen 
absorption scale measured the degree to which subjects are open to absorbing and self-altering 
experiences (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974). The Dissociative Experiences Scale (Wright & Loftus, 
1999), which measures the tendency for memory lapses and feelings of being dissociated from 
reality, was also completed. These personality measures were important as they were 
subsequently referred to in the false feedback paradigm in Session 2. 
Session 2. 
Motivation manipulation. At the beginning of Session 2, subjects were randomly 
assigned into two groups. In one group of subjects, we attempted to temporarily induce an 
increase in achievement-motivation (“Motivation Up” condition) while another group attempted 
to induce a decrease (“Motivation Down” condition). In particular, subjects who were in the 
Motivation Up condition received a paragraph  suggesting that recent research indicated that 
those with high achievement-motivation went on to have happier, more lucrative and successful 
lives, less social exclusion, and better romantic relationships. The Motivation Down 
manipulation suggested the opposite (unhappier, less lucrative and successful, and so on). 
Each subject was then asked to provide reasons for and to give examples of how 
achievement-motivation is associated with life happiness and success (Motivation Up) or failure 
(Motivation Down). For example, each of the subjects was asked to give two reasons for and one 
example of how achievement-motivation led to less social exclusion, better romantic 
relationships, and more lucrative careers. This procedure was adapted from a previous study in 
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which participants were induced to temporarily change their self-perceived levels of extraversion 
or introversion (Kunda & Sanitioso, 1989; also by linking them to academic success, as we did in 
the current study). See Appendix A in the Supplemental Material to see the paragraph and 
questions used. 
False Feedback (Suggestion). Subsequently, subjects were told that sophisticated 
computer software had taken their last weeks’ personality measures and had predicted that they 
were likely to experience a list of four childhood events (cf. materials first used in from 
Bernstein et al., 2005). Three of the suggested events in the list were true, and the remaining 
event was false. The false event was related to a childhood achievement experience (e.g. “I 
invented an important device”). The criterion to choose the one false item and the three genuine 
items depended on subjects’ responses in the LEI in Session 1, where a genuine event was 
defined as the highest combined score of confidence and memory on a particular item, and a 
false event was the lowest combined scores. Using this method, we created an individualized 
profile consisting of a set of four childhood events for each subjects, and each subject would 
receive his or her own falsely suggested event. Subjects were then asked to type out in sentences 
how each of the suggested events in their profiles happened when they were 10 years old or 
younger. An example of a profile that subjects might receive was given in Appendix B in the 
Supplemental Material. 
Post-test motivation and Life Events Inventory. At the end of Session 2, the participants 
again answered the same questions as in Session 1 to assess their achievement-motivation and 
their confidence of and memory for events listed in the Life Events Inventory (see Bernstein et 
al., 2005 for a full description of this procedure).  
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 Debriefing. Participants were informed that the research they had read in the vignette on 
achievement-motivation was in fact fake, and that some participants had also been given some 
false feedback about the likelihood of occurrence of autobiographical events. 
Results 
 Motivation Manipulation Check. We first test whether our attempted motivation 
manipulation did in fact effect two measures of motivation. The motivation manipulation did 
succeed in increasing one measure of achievement-motivation, but not the other. The Motivation 
Up condition had significantly higher posttest scores on the Life Goals Sentence (“I would like 
to create a lasting and notable accomplishment”; M = 7.16, SD = 3.37) than did the Motivation 
Down condition (M = 5.65, SD = 4.50), t(203) = 2.71, p = .007. This relationship held when 
adjusting for pretest scores on the Life Goals Sentence (β = .179, p = .005). However, our 
motivation manipulation had no significant effect on the posttest PRF-E measure of 
achievement-motivation, t(203) = .371, p = .711. This relationship was still not statistically 
significant when adjusting for pretest PRF-E, β = .016, p = .776).  
A possible explanation for these results is that these two measures may be tapping 
different aspects of achievement-motivation—indeed there was no significant correlation 
between the PRF-E and the Life Goal Sentences, r = .009, p = 0.903.  
2 x 2 ANOVAs. 
Confidence. A 2 (motivation up, motivation down) x 2 (pretest confidence, posttest 
confidence of the critical item) mixed ANOVA revealed the same pattern of results as seen 
above. That is, false feedback significantly increased confidence that the critical item happened 
F(1, 203) = 258.0, p < .001, ηp2 = .560. Confidence rose from Session 1 to 2 by M = 3.26, SD = 
2.85. But there was no significant effect of motivation condition, F(1, 203) = 0.06, p = .807, ηp2 
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< .001. The Motivation Up condition did not induce significantly higher confidence that the 
critical item occurred (M = 3.45, SD = 2.93), compared to the Motivation Down condition (M = 
3.09, SD = 2.78). There was no interaction between motivation condition and pretest/posttest 
confidence, F(1, 203) = 0.89, p = .346, ηp2 = .004. Modifying this ANOVA into an ANCOVA 
with fantasy proneness, dissociative experiences, and absorption, as covariates yielded the same 
pattern of results, with each of these three variables being nonsignificant covariates of 
confidence that the critical item happened (fantasy proneness, F(1, 200) = 0.27, p = .603; 
dissociative experiences, F(1, 200) = 2.47, p = .118; absorption F(1, 200) = 0.01, p =  .906). 
Memory. In a similar analysis focusing instead on memory ratings on the critical item, a 2 
(motivation up, motivation down) x 2 (pretest memory, posttest memory of the critical item) 
ANOVA revealed the same pattern of results as seen above. That is, false feedback did increase 
memory ratings of the critical item, F(1, 203) = 170.5, p < .001, ηp2 = .457. Change in memory 
for the event rose significantly by M = 2.69 (SD = 2.88) Likert scale points from Session 1 to 2. 
There was no significant effect of motivation condition, F(1, 203) = 0.94, p = .333, ηp2 = .005. 
The Motivation Up condition did not have a significantly higher inflation of memory for the 
critical achievement-related item (M = 2.74, SD = 2.97), compared to the Motivation Down 
condition (M = 2.64, SD = 2.80). There was no interaction between motivation condition and 
pretest/posttest memory, F(1, 203) = .34, p = .341, ηp2 = .002). The means and standard 
deviations of both the confidence and memory ratings for the critical lure item are given in Table 
1. . Changing this ANOVA into an ANCOVA with fantasy proneness, dissociative experiences, 
and absorption, as covariates yielded the same pattern of results, with each of these three 
variables being nonsignificant covariates of memory of the critical item (fantasy proneness, F(1, 
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200) = 0.002, p = .962; dissociative experiences, F(1, 200) = 0.76, p = .385; absorption F(1, 200) 
= 0.46, p =  .497). 
The results of these ANOVAs are that as hypothesized, false feedback appeared to have a 
significant effect on the inflation of memory and confidence. Our attempts to manipulate 
motivation did not lead to significant effects on memory distortion. 
Correlation between baseline motivation and inflation of confidence and memory. 
Pretest achievement-motivation measures did not significantly correlate with inflation of 
confidence that the critical achievement-related event took place (LGS: r = .039, p = .576; PRF-
E: r = .016, p = .819) or inflation of memory (LGS: r = .020, p = .775; PRF-E: r = .044, p = 
.534). Neither of the two measures of pretest achievement-motivation (Life Goal Sentence, PRF-
E) correlated with the pretest measures of memory and confidence in inventing an important 
device (an unlikely achievement-related event; rs < .105, ps > .134). Similarly, pretest 
motivation measures did not predict pretest confidence (rs < .078, ps > .264) or memory (rs < 
.102, ps > .134) of inventing a useful device.  
Table 2 reveals neither baseline measure of achievement-motivation predicted confidence 
inflation. However, Table 3 shows that in a regression analysis with memory inflation of 
inventing an important device that baseline achievement-motivation (Life Goals Statement) was 
a marginal predictor of confidence inflation. 
Excluding those who guessed the purpose of the study. At the end of the study we 
asked participants “what do you think the study is about?” and although none guessed the 
hypotheses exactly, we identified 14 out of the 205 in the analysis who we categorized as 
guessing it was about false memories or memory distortions. Excluding these individuals from 
the analyses shown above revealed the same patterns as shown above. Most importantly, the 
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non-significant relationship was maintained between achievement motivation and confidence 
and memory of an achievement-related false memory. For example, after excluding these 14 
cases, pretest achievement-motivation measures did not significantly correlate with inflation of 
confidence that the critical achievement-related event took place (LGS: r = .019, p = .789; PRF-
E: r = .019, p = .799, N = 191) or inflation of memory (LGS: r = .015, p = .842; PRF-E: r = .042, 
p = .560, N = 191).  
Discussion 
 We found that Hypothesis 1 was supported: false feedback had a significant effect on 
memory and confidence inflation. Hypothesis 2 was not supported: achievement-motivation did 
not show a reliable association with inflation of confidence, and was only was marginally 
associated with memory inflation (nonsignificant). We found no evidence for Hypothesis 3: our 
attempts to manipulate motivation experimentally had a mixed effect on self-reported 
achievement-motivation, and did not have a significant effect on memory distortions. It was 
surprising that our results did not support what we expected based on Sharman and Calacouris 
(2010). False feedback had a much larger effect on memory distortions than did achievement-
motivation. On finding that there was no main effect for motivation, we wondered if motivation 
might at least interact with false feedback. One limitation with Experiment 1 is that our design 
did not allow for a clean analysis of the interaction between motivation and false feedback. This 
is because in Experiment 1, we assigned as many as 9 different critical items in the false-
feedback to various participants, and these items were not chosen randomly. Another concern is 
that our initial finding was a Type 2 error—a failure to detect a relationship between motivation 
and false memories that does, in fact, exists. Therefore, before we concluded that the relationship 
found in Sharman and Calacouris’ (2010) does not conceptually replicate, we attempted a 
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modified experiment. We designed a follow-up study to build on what we learned from 
Experiment 1, by attempting to increase the strength of the motivation manipulation, introducing 
self-esteem as a possible moderator, and randomly assigning false feedback (suggestion).  
Experiment 2 
In this experiment we used random assignment for both independent variables 
(achievement-motivation and false feedback), with control groups for both so that we were able 
to examine not only main effects with some causal certainty, but also the interaction of 
motivation and false feedback. As in Experiment 1, we re-tested the three former main 
hypotheses. Because we had failed to find the expected relationship between motivation and 
memory distortion in Experiment 1, and because we were unconvinced that motivation plays no 
role at all, we investigated an additional hypothesis to the original 3 hypotheses given earlier:   
Hypothesis 4. Does achievement-motivation interact with false feedback in the formation 
of memory inflation?  
In attempting to explain the lack of a relationship between motivation and false memory 
in Experiment 1, we hypothesized that there may be moderators or confound variables that are 
masking an effect. For example, we hypothesized that self-esteem may be a factor that was 
potentially masking a relationship. Specifically, we hypothesized that those with low self-esteem 
would be more vulnerable to the effects of motivation and false memory, compared to those with 
high esteem. We theorized that those scoring high in self-esteem may have less doubt and be less 
swayed by outside influence, and thus be less vulnerable to succumbing to memory distortions as 
a result of motivational changes. We therefore hypothesized that self-esteem could be a variable 
creating noise that may be masking significant effects. For this reason, we added self-esteem as a 
covariate to Experiment 2 to explore whether controlling for self-esteem revealed significant 
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relationships between motivation and false memory that we did not find in Experiment 1. In the 
analysis, we also examine whether fantasy proneness would be a moderator of the relationship, 
due to its role as a moderator in previous memory distortion studies (e.g., Patihis et al., 2013; 
Patihis & Loftus, 2016). Examining such possible moderators is an attempt to find possible 
variables that might explain the negligible relationship between achievement motivation and 
memory or confidence inflation. 
Method 
 Participants 
Three hundred and sixty-six undergraduates participated online for course credit at a 
large research university in the Southwest of the United States. Of these 310 were female 
(84.7%) and 56 (15.3%) were male. Most participants were college aged (Mage = 21.1, SD = 4.53; 
range 18–57). Ethnicity was distributed as follows: 169 (46.2%) Asian, 87 (23.8%) Latino or 
Hispanic, 67 (18.3%) White, 9 (2.5%) African American, and 34 (9.3%) indicated two or more 
ethnicities. This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board (UCI IRB HS# 
20141084). 
Design 
The design was a 2 (motivation manipulated up, control) x 2 (false feedback of inventing 
device, no false feedback) experiment with the dependent measures being the self-reported 
clarity of the memory of inventing an important device and the confidence that the event 
happened (which were measured both pretest and posttest). Considerations of power determined 
that to distinguish an effect size of r = .2, a target sample size of at least 97 in each condition 
would be advisable (see Cohen, 1988; table on p. 102, for power = .8), and in this study there are 
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4 conditions (2 for false feedback, 2 for motivation). Our actual sample analyzed was 366, close 
to the planned 388 (4 x 97). 
Materials and Procedure  
Participants had to complete the questions online at the timeslot they had signed up for 
(they could choose timeslots that fell between 8am and 6pm weekdays). One week later, the 
participants completed Session 2 at the same hour that they had the previous week. Participants 
could use a computer at a place of their choosing, and were instructed on how to avoid 
distractions. These materials and procedure are similar to Sharman and Calacouris’ (2010) study, 
except we employed no imagination inflation exercise.  
Session 1. This session included the same pre-test questions for the Life Events 
Inventory, achievement-motivation, and personality scales as in Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, 
we added the Rosenberg 10 item self-esteem questionnaire (Rosenberg, 1965).  
Session 2. One week after Session 1, at the same hour of day, participants completed the 
second questionnaire. 
Motivation Manipulation. At the beginning of Session 2, participants were randomly 
assigned into either the Motivation Up condition or the Control group (motivation not 
manipulated). This involved the same paragraph and questions used in Experiment 1, although 
we added two more questions to attempt to deepen their engagement with the idea that 
achievement-motivation leads to happiness and success (see Appendix A in Supplemental 
Material for the materials used). In the Motivation Up condition the goal was to raise 
participants’ achievement-motivation, at least transiently for the experiment. In this condition, as 
in Experiment 1, participants first read a paragraph stating that research had demonstrated social 
and health benefits of having high achievement-motivation (this supposed research was in fact 
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made up, and was revealed as such during debriefing). Participants were then asked to write out 
reasons, with examples, for why high achievement-motivation is good for happiness, 
relationships, and why it helps avoid loneliness and social exclusion. 
Post Test Achievement-motivation. Participants then filled out questions assessing 
achievement-motivation—as before with the Life Goals Statement and 16 achievement-related 
items on the PRF-E. 
False feedback (Suggestion) Manipulation. Participants then received a personal profile 
similar to the false feedback in Experiment 1. In Experiment 1, we found that one of the most 
consistent and effective critical items was “you invented an important device.” So, participants in 
Experiment 2 were randomly assigned to either the False feedback condition (they were told that 
based on their personality questionnaires it is probable that “you invented an important device”) 
or the No False feedback condition. This false feedback item (“you invented an important 
device”) was embedded within these other more plausible items (see Appendix B in 
Supplemental Materials). The No False feedback condition received the same three likely events, 
and one other item unrelated to our critical item. 
Life Events Inventory. Toward the end of Session 2, participants filled out in the Life 
Events Inventory, giving their rating of their confidence and memory of 22 life events before the 
age of 10. The critical item was “You invented an important device.” 
Debriefing. Participants were informed of the fact that the research on achievement-
motivation was in fact fake, and that they had also been given some false feedback. 
Results 
Motivation Manipulation Check: Effect on Posttest Motivation Measures. Here, we 
test whether our attempted motivation manipulation did in fact affect any of our two 
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measures of motivation. The Motivation Up condition was not significantly higher on the 
posttest Life Goal Sentence (M = 7.45, SD = 3.56), compared to the Control group (M = 7.19, SD 
= 3.82), t(364) = .687, p = .266. This was also true when controlling for pretest Life Goal 
Sentence in an ANCOVA, F(1, 362) = .069, p = .793. 
Similarly, the Motivation Up condition did not have reliably higher posttest PRF-E scores 
(controlling for pretest PRF-E) compared to the Control group, F(1, 363) = .124, p = .724. 
Changes in PRF-E scores (posttest-pretest) were not significantly higher in either the Motivation 
Up condition (M = .07, SD = 1.84) or the Control Group (M = -.06, SD = 1.81), t(364) = .687, p 
= .492. 
Confidence: 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA. A 2 (motivation up, control) x 2 (false feedback of 
inventing a useful device, no false feedback) x 2 (pretest confidence, posttest confidence of the 
critical item) mixed ANOVA was performed. As predicted by Hypothesis 1, false feedback 
significantly increased confidence that the critical item (inventing an important device) happened 
F(1, 362) = 14.0, p < .001, ηp2 = .037. We found only partial but incomplete support for 
Hypothesis 3 with regard to confidence ratings: although there was a significant effect of 
motivation condition, F(1, 362) = 9.58, p = .002, ηp2 = .026, there was no significant interaction 
between motivation condition and confidence (pretest to posttest), F(1, 362) = 1.98, p = .161, ηp2 
= .005. There was no significant interaction between false feedback and motivation, F(1, 362) = 
4.01, p = .431, ηp2 = .002. There was a significant main effect for the repeated measures variable 
confidence (pretest, posttest), F(1, 362) = 35.5, p < .001, ηp2 = .089. There was a significant 
interaction between false feedback condition (misled, not misled) and confidence (pre, post), 
F(1, 362) = 63.2, p < .001, ηp2 = .149. There was also a significant three way interaction between 
false feedback condition, motivation condition, and confidence of inventing a useful device 
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(pretest, posttest), F(1, 362) = 10.1, p = .040, ηp2 = .012. The means and standard deviations of 
the confidence ratings for inventing a useful device are given, organized by experimental 
condition, in the top half of Table 4. 
Memory: 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA. In a similar analysis focusing instead on memory ratings on 
the critical item, A 2 (motivation up, control) x 2 (false feedback of inventing a useful device, no 
false feedback) x 2 (pretest memory, posttest memory of inventing a useful device) mixed 
ANOVA revealed that false feedback significantly increased memory of inventing an important 
device, F(1, 362) = 16.4, p < .001, ηp2 = .043. Thus Hypothesis 1 was again supported. There 
was no support for Hypothesis 3 in relation to memory ratings: there was no significant main 
effect of motivation condition, F(1, 362) = 3.09, p = .080, ηp2 = .008, and no significant 
interaction between motivation condition and memory ratings (pretest to posttest repeated 
measures), F(1, 362) = 0.05, p = .825, ηp2 < .001. There was no significant interaction between 
false feedback and motivation, F(1, 362) = 0.01, p = .909, ηp2 < .001. There was a significant 
main effect for the repeated measures variable memory of inventing a device (pretest, posttest), 
F(1, 362) = 6.75, p = .010, ηp2 = .018. There was a significant interaction between false feedback 
condition (misled, not misled) and memory of inventing a device (pre, post), F(1, 362) = 24.7, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .064. There was a marginally significant three way interaction between false 
feedback condition, motivation condition, and memory of inventing a useful device (pretest, 
posttest), F(1, 362) = 3.85, p = .051, ηp2 = .011.The means and standard deviations of the 
memory ratings for the inventing a useful device item are given by condition,  in the bottom half 
of Table 4. 
Confidence Inflation. We performed a 2 x 2 ANCOVA with false feedback and 
motivation as the independent variables, the change in confidence of inventing an important 
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device as the dependent variables, while controlling for the covariate of baseline (pretest) 
achievement-motivation (PRF-E). The overall model was statistically significant F(4, 361) = 
19.1, p < .001, η2 = .175, R2 = .168, adjusted R2 = .166. We found a main effect for false 
feedback on confidence inflation F(1, 361) = 61.8, p < .001, η2 = .146. We found no main effect 
of motivation manipulation on confidence inflation F(1, 361) = .067, p = .796, η2 < .001. In 
accordance with Hypothesis 4, Figure 1 shows the significant interaction between false feedback 
and motivation, F(1, 361) = 4.31, p = .039, η2 = .012.  
Memory Inflation. Similarly, we performed a 2 x 2 ANCOVA with false feedback and 
motivation as the independent variables, the change in memory of inventing an important device 
(posttest – pretest) as the dependent variable while controlling for the covariate of baseline 
(pretest) achievement-motivation (PRF-E).  
The overall model was statistically significant F(4, 361) = 7.38, p < .001, R2 = .076, 
adjusted R2 = .065. We found a main effect for false feedback on memory inflation F(1, 361) = 
24.3, p < .001, η2 = .063. We found no main effect of motivation manipulation on confidence 
inflation F(1, 361) = .067, p = .796, η2 < .001. In congruence with Hypothesis 4, we found a 
significant interaction between false feedback and motivation, F(1, 361) = 3.85, p = .050, η2 = 
.011 (see Figure 2). 
The nature of these interactions appear to indicate that the motivation manipulation had 
little effect in the absence of false feedback, but the motivation manipulation did appear to 
enhance inflation of confidence and memory when false feedback was present. 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Model with Confidence Inflation as the Dependent 
Measure. We conducted this analysis to investigate which variables are associated with 
confidence distortion while adjusting for other variables. We were particularly interested to see if 
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measures of achievement-motivation were associated. The hierarchical regression in Table 5 
summarizes the predictors of confidence inflation for inventing an important device. In all three 
models, false feedback was a significant predictor, as expected. 
Does Baseline Motivation Predict Confidence Inflation? Model 3 in Table 5 reveals that 
baseline achievement-motivation (both PRF-E and LGS) is a marginal but nonsignificant 
predictor of increasing confidence. This offers no support for Hypothesis 2. 
Other Factors. Model 3 reveals that fantasy proneness is a significant predictor of 
confidence inflation, and self-esteem as a marginal positive predictor of confidence. 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Model with Memory Inflation as the Dependent 
Measure. The hierarchical regression in Table 6 summarizes the predictors of memory inflation 
for inventing an important device. In all three models, false-feedback was a significant predictor, 
as expected. 
Does Baseline Motivation Predict Memory Inflation? Models 2 and 3 in Table 6 reveals 
that baseline achievement-motivation was not a significant predictor of increasing memory of 
inventing an important device. This provides no evidence for Hypothesis 2. 
Other Factors. Model 3 reveals that self-esteem was a marginal positive predictor of 
memory inflation of inventing an important device. 
Excluding those who guessed the purpose of the study. At the end of the study we 
asked participants “what do you think the study is about?” and although no one guessed the study 
was about motivation and memory distortion, we identified 9 out of the 366 in the analysis who 
we categorized as guessing it was about false memories or memory distortions. Excluding these 
individuals from the analyses shown above revealed the same patterns as shown above. Most 
importantly, as before we found negligible/small relationships between measures of achievement 
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motivation and confidence/memory inflation of an achievement-related item involving inventing 
an important device (range: r = -.058 to r = .101,  ps ranging from .057 to .479).  
Discussion 
 In Experiment 2 we found that our attempts to increase the strength of the motivation 
manipulation (compared to Experiment 1) failed to significantly change self-reported 
achievement motivation, despite the addition of additional writing prompts. The results also 
again failed to conceptually replicate Sharman and Calacouris’ (2010) finding of a significant 
relationship between achievement-motivation and autobiographical memory distortions. This 
lack of a significant relationship held even when controlling for hypothesize covariates, such as 
self-esteem. Whether the relationship between achievement-motivation and memory and 
confidence inflation is zero or very small is unclear—but what is clear in our samples is that the 
relationship is not moderate to large. 
 We found a significant interaction between the motivation and false feedback 
manipulations on both memory and confidence inflation. However, because the motivation 
manipulation did not significantly raise achievement motivations, interpretation of these 
interactions is difficult. Nevertheless, these results may suggest that future research could 
investigate whether motivation affects memory distortions via interactions with misinformation 
more powerfully than without misinformation.  
General Discussion 
 Over two experiments we found false feedback to be a statistically significant predictor 
of memory and confidence distortion, and a larger factor compared to achievement-motivation. 
To our surprise, in Experiment 1, achievement-motivation did not have a significant relationship 
with confidence inflation of achievement-related events. In contrast, Sharman & Calacouris 
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(2010) found that the other measure of achievement motivation, PRF-E (not LGS), predicted 
memory and confidence inflation in an imagination paradigm. Interestingly, we found no 
significant relationship between the two measures of achievement motivation, while Sharman 
and Calacouris found a small relationship (r = .30). A possible explanation for these results is 
that these two measures are likely measuring different aspects of achievement-motivation, which 
in our case led to a negligible effect size, and a small-to-moderate effect size in Sharman and 
Calacouris. 
Experiment 2 again found little evidence for a relationship between  motivation and 
memory or confidence inflation, which was contrary to both our predictions based on the limited 
past research. However, we did find that false feedback and motivation interacted with both 
memory and confidence inflation. In other words, the Motivation Up manipulation had little 
effect in the absence of false feedback, but when participants did receive false feedback the 
motivation manipulation appeared to enhance memory and confidence distortion. Contrary to our 
hypothesis, Experiment 2 showed that self-esteem was not a mediator that was masking 
motivation effects in Experiment 1. It remains to be seen in future research if motivational 
manipulations interact with false feedback in the same way.  We can only speculate that 
motivation has an effect on memory distortions not so much in a direct way, but by interacting 
with misinformation. Our results were difficult to interpret in this regards, due to the negligible 
effect of our motivation manipulation on self-reported motivation. Future research must address 
these limitations, although it is unclear whether using similar methodology to ours or Sharman 
and Calacouris’ (2010) would be fruitful.  
In addition, both measures of baseline motivation (pretest LGS & PRF-E) were 
nonsignificant, but marginal predictors of confidence inflation for inventing an important device, 
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but not of memory inflation. Contrast this with the results of Experiment 1 that a baseline 
measure of motivation was marginally associated with memory but not with confidence inflation. 
While the effect of false feedback was strong and consistent, the relationship with motivation 
and memory distortion was weak and inconsistent. From these results we posit that false 
feedback is the more powerful factor in memory distortions, compared to motivations, although 
this idea requires further testing. 
There are some limitations to these studies. One limitation of these studies is that the 
effect of the motivation manipulation was negligible. This may be informative for future 
researchers. Future studies could experiment with manipulations that more powerfully affect 
motivation, with the understanding that some trait-like motivations may be somewhat difficult to 
manipulate. An example of an alternative way to prime achievement motivation might include 
Woike et al.’s (2009) technique of having those in the experimental group write about a vivid 
achievement memory. It should also be noted that baseline achievement-motivation was at best a 
weak correlate of memory distortion, so future research could perhaps find other measures of 
achievement-motivation, or focus on a different type of motivation. Another limitation is the 
generalizability of the findings on account that half of participants self-identified as Asians. Due 
to possible differences in orientation to achievement motivations and/or individualism vs. 
collectivist approaches to individual acheivement, future research could investigate different 
samples in terms of ethnic percentages. In addition, the students in our sample were at a selective 
university, and there may have been a ceiling effect on achievement motivation, and future 
research could sample a less academically selective group of people. Another potential concern 
is that the results were skewed by participants who guessed the purpose of the study, but 
analyses excluding individuals who indicated some understanding of the purpose of the study 
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yielded similar results to the results before exclusion. Another concern may be that we only 
targeted one false item in both study 1 and 2, with the possibility that just one measure of false 
memory may decrease chances of finding significant results. Future research could investigate 
using more than one false-item, though that would run the risk that participants become 
increasingly suspicious with numerous false suggestions. 
The lack of an association between two variables in correlational data naturally gives 
pause as to whether finding a causal relationship in experimentation will be fruitful. Instead, 
because there are a number of paradigms to induce memory distortion and motivation, we 
recommend future research investigate different methodologies to the one we employed. In 
addition, the lesson we wish to share with future researchers is that attempts to manipulate 
achievement motivation as we did may fail, and that the relationship between achievement 
motivation and memory distortion of achievement-related autobiographical memories may be 
weaker than previously thought in this particular domain. This is not to minimize the quality of 
our research: we feel it was well planned and executed. However, it simply did not bear the fruit 
that we intended: we did not establish a causal link between achievement motivation and 
achievement-related autobiographical memory distortions.  Future research should first establish 
a strong correlation between a measure of motivation and a measure of memory distortion, and 
once that relationship has replicated, then attempt to manipulate motivation in an experiment to 
establish a causal link. Nevertheless, an alternative approach would be to check whether the 
subtle differences between our experiments and Sharman and Calacouris’ study led to a 
negligible relationship in our experiments. It is possible that running participants in lab would 
have yielded a significant association. Therefore we wouldn’t want to rule out an exact 
replication of Sharman and Calacouris (2010), and if replicated, we would concede there may be 
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reliable relationship between achievement motivation and achievement-related memory 
distortion in that domain. 
In two experiments, the current research explored the relationship between motivation 
and memory distortion. Contrary to previous findings (Sharman & Calacouris, 2010), we found a 
negligible relationship between achievement motivation and achievement-related 
autobiographical memory distortion. This result suggests that the relationship between 
motivation and memory distortion, albeit theoretically sound, may be weaker than previously 
thought. Future research could explore reasons why the relationship between motivation and 
memory distortion is inconsistent across studies. Such research is especially important to clarify 
the theoretical link between motivation and memory distortion.       
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Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations of Confidence and Memory Scores of Inventing a Useful Device 
(Pretest and Posttest measures), by Motivation Condition  
 Motivation Down Condition  Motivation Up Condition 
 M SD n  M SD n 
Pretest Confidence that 
Critical Item Happened 1.50 1.23 105  1.26 0.77 100 
Posttest Confidence that 
Critical Item Happened 4.57 2.79 105  4.71 2.86 100 
        
Pretest Memory of Critical 
Item 1.68 1.73 105  1.34 1.12 100 
Posttest Confidence of 
Critical Item 4.20 2.65 105  4.10 2.73 100 
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Table 2 
Experiment 1: Two-Model Hierarchical Linear Regressions with Change in Confidence of 
Inventing an Important Device as the Dependent Measure 
 
 
Model Independent Variables in Model β p VIF 
     
1 Motivation Manipulation -.017 .802 1.005 
 False Feedback Invented Device .324 .000 1.005 
     
2 Motivation Manipulation -.018 .785 1.006 
 False Feedback Invented Device .322 .000 1.006 
 Pretest Achievement Motivation (LGS)) .093 .163 1.001 
 Pretest Achievement-motivation (PRF-E) .009 .897 1.001 
     
Note. Dependent Variable = Change in confidence of inventing an important device (posttest 
minus pretest scores on Life Events Inventory item). Boldface = significant predictors. Italic = 
marginal predictors. LGS = Life Goals Statement. PRF-E = Personality Research Form-E.
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Table 3 
Experiment 1: Two-Model Hierarchical Linear Regressions with Change in Memory of Inventing 
an Important Device as the Dependent Measure 
 
 
Model Independent Variables in Model β p VIF 
     
1 Motivation Manipulation -.035 .607 1.005 
 False Feedback Invented Device .259 .000 1.005 
     
2 Motivation Manipulation -.037 .587 1.006 
 False Feedback Invented Device .256 .000 1.006 
 Pretest Achievement Motivation (LGS) .119 .080 1.001 
 Pretest Achievement-motivation (PRF-E) .015 .831 1.001 
     
Note. Dependent Variable = Change in memory of inventing an important device (posttest 
minus pretest scores on Life Events Inventory item). LGS = Life Goals Statement. PRF-E = 
Personality Research Form-E .        
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Table 4 
Means and Standard Deviations of Confidence and Memory Scores of Inventing a Useful Device 
(Pretest and Posttest Measures), by False Feedback Condition and Motivation Condition  
 Motivation Control 
Condition 
 Motivation Up 
Condition 
 M SD n  M SD n 
Confidence:         
Invented 
Device False 
Feedback 
Pretest Confidence that 
Critical Item Happened 1.86 1.61 84  1.89 1.89 103 
Posttest Confidence that 
Critical Item Happened 3.06 2.59 84  3.89 2.88 103 
        
Control  
(No False 
Feedback) 
Pretest Confidence that 
Critical Item Happened 1.68 1.70 97  2.49 2.30 82 
Posttest Confidence that 
Critical Item Happened 1.53 1.42 97  2.18 1.98 82 
         
Memory:         
Invented 
Device False 
Feedback 
Pretest Memory of Critical 
Item 2.24 2.20 84  2.27 2.36 103 
Posttest Memory of Critical 
Item 2.94 2.56 84  3.54 2.61 103 
        
Control  
(No False 
Feedback) 
Pretest Memory of Critical 
Item 1.82 1.96 97  2.41 2.31 82 
Posttest Confidence of 
Critical Item 1.74 1.84 97  1.88 1.74 82 
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Table 5 
Experiment 2: Three Hierarchical Linear Regression Models with Change in Confidence of 
Inventing an Important Device as the Dependent Measure 
 
 
Model Independent Variables in Model β p VIF 
     
1 Motivation Manipulation .062 .204 1.009 
 False Feedback Manipulation  .379 .000 1.009 
     
2 Motivation Manipulation .076 .123 1.020 
 False Feedback Manipulation  .367 .000 1.028 
 Pretest Achievement Motivation (LGS)) -.077 .122 1.052 
 Pretest Achievement-motivation (PRF-E) .093 .063 1.072 
 Self Esteem Rosenberg .069 .169 1.078 
     
3 Motivation Manipulation .069 .159 1.031 
 False Feedback Manipulation  .371 .000 1.032 
 Pretest Achievement-motivation (LGS) -.088 .078 1.072 
 Pretest Achievement-motivation (PRF-E) .093 .064 1.075 
 Self Esteem (Rosenberg’s) .092 .075 1.132 
 Fantasy Proneness (CEQ) .107 .031 1.046 
 Age -.027 .593 1.056 
     
Note. Dependent Variable = Change in confidence of inventing an important device (posttest 
minus pretest scores on Life Events Inventory item). Boldface = significant predictors. Italic = 
marginal predictors. LGS = Life Goals Statement. PRF-E = Personality Research Form-E . 
CEQ = Creative Experiences Questionnaire.       
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Table 6 
Experiment 2: Three Model Hierarchical Linear Regression with Change in Memory of 
Inventing an Important Device as the Dependent Measure 
 
 
Model Independent Variables in Model β p VIF 
     
1 Motivation Manipulation .027 .600 1.009 
 False Feedback Manipulation  .254 .000 1.009 
     
2 Motivation Manipulation .030 .563 1.020 
 False Feedback Manipulation  .240 .000 1.028 
 Pretest Achievement Motivation (LGS)) .030 .573 1.052 
 Pretest Achievement-motivation (PRF-E) .024 .648 1.072 
 Self Esteem Rosenberg .082 .121 1.078 
     
3 Motivation Manipulation .021 .681 1.031 
 False Feedback Manipulation  .242 .000 1.032 
 Pretest Achievement-motivation (LGS) .025 .638 1.072 
 Pretest Achievement-motivation (PRF-E) .026 .622 1.075 
 Self Esteem (Rosenberg’s) .104 .056 1.132 
 Fantasy Proneness (CEQ) .070 .179 1.046 
 Age -.061 .246 1.056 
     
Note. Dependent Variable = Change in memory of inventing an important device (posttest 
minus pretest scores on Life Events Inventory item). LGS = Life Goals Statement. PRF-E = 
Personality Research Form-E . CEQ = Creative Experiences Questionnaire   
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Figure 1. The significant interaction between false feedback and motivation manipulations on 
change in confidence from pretest to posttest of inventing an important device before age 10. 
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Figure 2. The significant interaction between false feedback and motivation manipulations on 
change in memory of inventing an important device before the age of 10 (from pretest to 
posttest). 
 
